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 ABSTRACT 
            Barriers to Sustainable Hunting-Based Conservation of 
       Elephants in Zimbabwe  
          Jessica Cusworth 
  The international demand for ivory has devastated African elephant 
populations. In 2015, more elephants were poached for ivory than were born. 
Many countries have sought to decrease poaching pressures through ivory trade 
bans. However, Zimbabwe, home to the second largest African elephant 
population, funds its anti-poaching efforts with revenue from ivory exports. The 
ivory bans implemented by other countries prevent Zimbabwe from generating 
many sources of ivory revenue. These bans hamper Zimbabwe’s ability to fund 
anti-poaching efforts, and exacerbate the complex interactions between the 
social, economic, and political factors which contribute to poaching. Increasing 
the understanding of the relationships between poaching factors and poaching 
policy responses is therefore vital. The DPSIR (Drivers, Pressures, State, 
Impacts, and Responses) framework is utilized to understand how the 
interactions between poaching factors and policy responses create feedback 
loops that may increase poaching. This analysis identifies the key areas for 
policy intervention: economic stagnation, human wildlife conflicts, and political 
corruption. Coping strategies are recommended for each area to potentially 
decrease elephant poaching pressures in Zimbabwe.  
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1. Introduction  
Anthropogenic climate change, land-use change, and resource exploitation 
have caused devastating declines in global biodiversity (Williams et al. 2015; 
Boivin et al. 2016). Humans have driven Earth towards its sixth mass-
extinction event, in which species are facing extinction rates that are 1000 
times historical rates (Ceballos et al. 2015; Mantyka-Pringle et al. 2015). 
When combined with environmental changes, the exploitation and trade of 
certain species has brought many close to extinction (Nellemann et al. 
2014). The black market demand for ivory has fueled a devastating trend of 
African elephant poaching, where more elephants are being killed than are 
being born (Carrington 2016). Nearly 40,000 African elephants were 
poached in 2012 to satiate global demand for ivory, and their population has 
decreased by nearly 30% in just the past seven years (Wittemyer et al. 
2014; Chase et al. 2016). Though the Convention on International Trade of 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) imposed a ban on 
international ivory trading in 1989, the weight of globally traded ivory is 
currently three times greater than it was in 1998 (Bennett 2014). 
 
CITES has been the primary mechanism for addressing international natural 
resource trade exploitation since its ratification in 1975. It is a voluntary 
international agreement that is widely recognized as one of the most 
successful and important international environmental treaties in the world. 
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This appraisal is based on a large number of member states (183), which 
are referred to as Parties. This is also based on its successes in granting 
protection to 35,000 plant and animal species (Doukakis 2012; Dickson 
2002; Fuchs 2010). Every three years, CITES Parties are required to attend 
a Conference of the Parties (CoP) to create or amend national-level trade 
regulations on wildlife. CITES does not have the power to implement these 
regulations, however, the Convention itself is legally binding on the Parties. 
This means that if a Party wishes to remain a CITES member, they must 
implement the Convention (CITES 2016). It is therefore up to each Party to 
implement CITES regulations by creating and enforcing their own domestic 
laws. The success of CITES regulations are therefore dependent on each 
member state’s execution and enforcement of the bans on their own terms 
(Padgett 1995). 
 
At the most recent CoP in 2016, all Parties were urged to completely shut 
down any remaining domestic legal markets to reduce elephant poaching 
pressures (USFWS 2016). Complete market closure is thought to prevent 
criminals from sneaking illegal ivory into legal domestic stocks, particularly in 
Asian markets (Hsiang & Sekar 2016). The United States and China, both 
top ivory consuming countries, have now put forward legislation for complete 
closure of their domestic ivory markets (Neslan 2016). Zimbabwe, a CITES 
member since 1981, has continuously fought these international and 
domestic ivory trade bans, and fervently argued for reopening legal 
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international markets at CoP 2016 (CITES 2016). 
 
Zimbabwe’s frustrations about the impacts of these bans are warranted 
because they directly interfere with their own elephant management 
practices. Zimbabwe is a major actor in the international ivory trade as it is a 
key elephant range state. It hosts the world’s second largest elephant 
population, with nearly 83,000 individuals left, second only to Botswana 
(Zimbabwe Park & Wildlife Management Authority 2016). Populations in this 
region are greatly threatened by poachers, who are responsible for nearly 
60% of total African elephant deaths (Carrington 2016). Zimbabwe relies on 
hunting-based conservation, defined as trophy hunting and regulated ivory 
sales, to generate funds for anti-poaching efforts as well as community 
development projects (CITES 2016). This income incentivizes elephant 
conservation for locals who may otherwise view elephants as pests and be 
tempted to poach them (Alexander & McGregor 2000; Frost & Bond 2007).  
 
As ivory restrictions tighten, Zimbabwe may have trouble sustainably 
continuing these conservation methods. Without legal domestic ivory 
markets in the U.S and China, Zimbabwe’s communities may face 
challenges generating sufficient funds for conservation and community 
development from the legal sale of ivory. This may ultimately reduce funds 
for anti-poaching efforts, while the absence of legal profit may drive 
communities to poach elephants to sell their ivory on the black market 
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(Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority 2015; Lemieux & 
Clarke 2009).  
 
The topic of evaluating the sustainable use of elephants has been explored 
quite extensively, though the literature depends on data from the 1990’s 
through the early 2000’s to shape arguments (Abensperg-Traun 2009; Frost 
& Bond 2007; Hutton & Leader-Williams 2003; Hitch 1998). This spans the 
time when many global domestic ivory markets were still flourishing and 
capable of sufficiently funding conservation and anti-poaching efforts. As 
such, this literature does not account for new ivory restrictions from the last 
decade. This suggests a gap in understanding regarding the evaluation of 
the logistical problems of hunting-based conservation of elephants with 
these new restrictions. There is also ample literature offering research 
regarding the effects of ivory bans on poaching. This research argues that a 
specific poaching factor, such as government corruption (Bennett 2014; 
Nellemann 2013; Varun, Ewing, & Miller 2014), civil conflict (Lemieux & 
Clarke 2009; Schneider 2008), or international ivory demand (Stiles 2004), 
determines the efficacy of ivory restrictions in a given country. In essence, 
this research presents the connection between an individual poaching factor 
and ivory bans as a linear cause and effect relationship. It fails to take into 
account situations where multiple poaching drivers create feedback loops 
with poaching policy responses. For example, a CITES decision allowing 
Zimbabwe’s one-off legal ivory sale to China and Japan in 2008 was 
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intended to reduce poaching. However, this ban lead to increased poaching 
in the following years (Hsiang & Sekar 2016). This feedback loop was fueled 
by the drivers of an expanding Asian economy, a stagnant Zimbabwean 
economy, and rife political corruption to facilitate illegal trading after the 2008 
trade. There is therefore an urgent need to increase understanding into the 
relationships between multiple poaching factors and poaching policy 
responses. 
  
This paper intends to fill these gaps by considering the multiple causes and 
effects of poaching as a feedback loop, also accounting for new domestic 
ivory restrictions from CITES Parties. It does not intend to argue for or 
against specific conservation methods or ivory bans. Instead, this study 
examines how the increasing domestic and international restrictions on ivory 
trading may present barriers to sustainable hunting-based conservation of 
elephants in Zimbabwe. The following research questions are answered to 
achieve this: 
 
1. What interactions between multiple socio-economic factors contribute to 
poaching in Zimbabwe? 
2. How have the policy responses to poaching affected these factors and 
interactions? 
3. Which aspects of this system serve as barriers to sustainable hunting 
 based conservation of elephants? 
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From a methodological perspective, this paper employs the DPSIR (Drivers, 
Pressures, State, Impacts, Responses) framework to address the first two 
questions. This is used to understand the relationships between the various 
drivers and pressures that are affecting the state of elephant poaching and 
outcomes of conservation and anti-poaching measures. The third question will be 
addressed by reflecting on the findings of this framework application to highlight 
the barriers to hunting-based conservation. Using the DPSIR framework to 
answer these questions enables an understanding regarding the multiple and 
interacting factors that influence elephant poaching in Zimbabwe. This 
knowledge may be valuable for identifying Zimbabwe’s key areas for potential 
policy intervention to combat poaching in light of new ivory restrictions.  
    
This paper is structured as follows. The background provides an overview of 
CITES structure and CITES actions taken on elephants, covering the period 
reaching up to the most recent CoP in 2016. The background also discusses 
Zimbabwe’s history of elephant trophy hunting to provide context for the DPSIR 
analysis. Section 3 outlines the methods and DPSIR framework used to analyze 
the system of poaching in Zimbabwe. Findings are presented in Section 4. Here, 
the DPSIR framework is applied to first understand connections between 
poaching factors independently from policy responses. Next, the policy 
responses are factored into the framework to map out the cascading effects 
these policies have had on Zimbabwe’s poaching factors. These results are then 
used to establish the socio-economic barriers to Zimbabwe’s hunting-based 
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conservation in light of the existing domestic and international efforts to ban all 
ivory trading. By establishing these barriers, the many points of policy 
intervention for resolving conservation conflicts are identified. The results and 
policy interventions are discussed in Section 5, followed by concluding remarks 
in Section 6. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 CITES 
CITES Structure 
CITES classifies species into a three-tiered system of appendices in accordance 
with the extent of their extinction risk (CITES 1973). Species at risk of extinction 
are classified in Appendix I, which restricts all commercial trade of the species 
and its products between Parties. Species listed under Appendix II are at risk of 
facing the threat of extinction unless trade is restricted, and require a permit for 
international trading for commercial purposes. Appendix III species have legal 
protection in at least one CITES member state and international help has been 
requested to control the trade of the species. 
 
There are two CITES structural components that may complicate the intended 
protection of the African elephant through trade regulations. The first component 
is the Parties’ ability to take a “reservation,” which enables them to remain 
unaffected by a change of the listing of a species (Reeve 2002). This means that 
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the country can still participate in the international trading of a species with other 
non-member states or with other Parties with the same reservation. A country 
may choose to take a reservation if they feel they have a strong economic 
interest in the listed species, as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and many other African 
countries did upon the initial Annex I listing of the African elephant. This CITES 
exemption was implemented to demonstrate a sense of flexibility and 
compromise in order to encourage non-member states to join CITES (Reeve 
2002). However, this may be considered a significant weakness within CITES, as 
it allows Parties to participate only as long as the mandates are useful for their 
own needs. 
 
The second component that may hinder successful protection through trade 
regulations is that hunting trophies are typically exempt from CITES mandates. 
This means that trophy ivory can be imported, exported, and re-exported across 
national boundaries, as long as there is clear CITES documentation. This 
exception is problematic for elephant conservation as it has created routes for 
illegally obtained poached ivory to slip into the trade of legally obtained trophy 
ivory from legal hunting (Hsiang & Sekar 2016). This exception also requires trust 
in often-corrupt countries to abide by their annual trophy export quotas, and trust 
that these quotas are based on sound science. If either of these requirements 
are not fulfilled, supposedly “sustainable” legal trophy hunting may actually cause 
unsustainable population declines, as is the case in Zimbabwe (USFWS 2015).  
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CITES African Elephant Listing 
The African Elephant was initially classified under Appendix II in 1977, allowing 
for continued international trade for commercial purposes. During the following 
decade, spanning 1977-1989, the African elephant population dropped by nearly 
50% (USFWS). When this legal international commercial ivory trade was first 
questioned by CITES Parties in the 1980’s, many Southern African countries 
argued that the legal ivory market functioned as a means of conservation for their 
countries. They claimed that their countries all had a great economic stake in 
maintaining healthy African elephant populations for the purpose of harvesting 
ivory for commercial trade (Padgett 1995). However, the catastrophic decline of 
African elephant populations did not support these claims (Bennett 2014). 
 
As a result of these declining elephant populations, the species was placed 
under Appendix I of CITES in 1989. This gave the elephants the highest level of 
protection and banned commercial trade of the species, effectively banning the 
international trade of ivory. However, the elephant populations in Botswana, 
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe were able to take a reservation on this 
listing and return to Appendix II, though with a special “annotation” that prohibited 
commercial ivory sales, except for two occasions (CITES Secretariat 2016). This 
allowed these countries to trade their government stocks of ivory from elephants 
that died of “natural deaths” to China and Japan on two occasions in 1999 and 
2008 (Nellemann et al 2013). It should be noted that the Parties agreed upon this 
trade unanimously, as the funds raised were to go directly to conservation efforts 
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(CITES 2008). 
 
The question of whether to ease or tighten control over the ivory trade was at the 
center of the CITES Johannesburg meeting in 2016 (CITES 2016). The Parties 
opposed Zimbabwe’s proposal to reopen international ivory trading, and rejected 
a decision-making mechanism that would allow for new proposals to reopen 
international ivory trade in the future. However, the Parties also voted against an 
African coalition's proposal to move all African elephants to an Annex 1 listing, 
citing fear of backlash from affected countries (CITES 2016).  This would have 
retracted Zimbabwe’s reservation that has allowed them to remain capable of 
selling government ivory stockpiles on certain occasions (CITES 2016). 
Ultimately, all Parties were strongly encouraged to close their own domestic ivory 
markets to cut off the demand side of black market ivory (USFWS 2016).  
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2.2 Zimbabwe’s Sustainable Elephant Use 
CAMPFIRE Program 
 
Fig. 1: Zimbabwe’s Hunting-Based Elephant Conservation. Author: Jessica Cusworth, based on 
information from the CAMPFIRE Association. 
 
Zimbabwe’s plan for sustainable hunting-based conservation of elephants, 
shown in Figure 1, is best demonstrated through its CAMPFIRE program, which 
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began in 1989 (Degeorges & Reilly 2009). This program was the first of its kind 
to stress the importance of enabling communities living with wildlife to receive 
direct benefits from it, known as “appropriate authority” (Alexander & McGregor 
2000). The ultimate goal of the program was to show communities how effective 
environmental stewardship produces long-term financial benefits (CAMPFIRE 
Association). CAMPFIRE intends to incentivize wildlife conservation by providing 
producer communities with “fair” compensation for use of their wildlife resources 
through contracts with private tourism and safari operators (CAMPFIRE 
Association). This program also intends to fund training and financial support for 
law enforcement officers to ensure that the rules for natural resource protection 
are obeyed, including anti-poaching monitoring (CAMPFIRE Association).  
 
There is conflicting research as to whether or not households actually accrued 
significant income from the program (Hitch 1998; Degeorges & Reilly 2009). 
There have often been issues from underpayments or delayed payments to 
households (Degeorges & Reilly 2009). However, Frost and Bond (2007) have 
concluded that the program’s revenue was a significant source of funds for the 
region during the political instability of the early 1990’s. Between 1989 and 1993, 
24% of local revenue was income from wildlife, which exceeded other sources in 
all districts, including government grants (Frost & Bond 2007). 
 
Sport hunting licenses historically generated the majority of revenue for the 
program, which has become an increasingly more controversial issue for the 
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international community over the last two decades (Hitch 1998; Corn & Fletcher 
1997). The program generated $20 million in revenue to the communities 
between 1989-2001, 89% of which came from sport hunting (Frost & Bond 2007). 
More recent CAMPFIRE revenue data is scant, however CAMPFIRE submitted 
an undated report to the U.S Fish & Wildlife Service showing that the program 
generated $2.5 million in hunting revenues in 2012 (USFWS 2015). It is expected 
that the international actions taken against the import of elephant trophies, such 
as the closure of domestic ivory markets in the U.S and China, may significantly 
contribute towards a decline in CAMPFIRE revenue in the coming years 
(USFWS 2015).  
 
Although the international community has taken steps to further restrict ivory 
trading, Zimbabwe “confirms its commitment to the sustainable use of elephants 
and other wildlife” in its 2015-2020 Elephant Action Plan (p.12, Zimbabwe Parks 
and Wildlife Management Authority 2015). Zimbabwe maintains that regulated 
trophy hunting, and the ability to import trophies back to the tourists’ countries, is 
absolutely essential for the survival of the species. They assert that hunting-
based conservation provides incentives to locals and generates funds for 
monitoring protected areas. Their management plan claims that 75% revenue 
from elephant hunting goes towards elephant conservation (Zimbabwe Parks and 
Wildlife Management Authority 2015). It is important to note that the Zimbabwean 
government does not allocate funds to the primary wildlife enforcement agency, 
the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority (ZPWMA) (Zimbabwe 
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Parks and Wildlife Management Authority 2016; USFWS 2015). Therefore, the 
ZPWMA must generate their own funding through donations and revenue from 
commercial services on their properties, such as lodging in national parks (Suich, 
Child, & Spenceley 2009). 
 
Through this approach, Zimbabwe intends to fund more men on the ground to 
combat poaching, improve monitoring and research, and incentivize maintaining 
or increasing elephant range. They claim that this will require at least $12 million 
per year to protect the nearly 60,000 km2 of elephant range in the country, which 
they assert must come from the help of the international community (Zimbabwe 
Parks and Wildlife Management Authority 2015). However, it should be noted 
that after requesting documentation from the Zimbabwean government and 
ZPWMA concerning their wildlife management, the United States Fish & Wildlife 
Services was unable to find sufficient scientifically supported evidence that 
Zimbabwe’s elephant population estimates in the plan were accurate enough for 
Zimbabwe to craft any management decisions (USFWS 2015). Such 
management decisions include setting hunting quotas and estimating the cost of 
anti-poaching efforts.  
 
3.0 Methods 
3.1 Data Collection and Analysis 
The research for the literature review in this paper was performed between 
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September 2016 and February 2017. The JSTOR, ProQuest, GALE, 
SpringerLink, ScienceDirect, PeerJ, and PubMed Central databases were utilized 
to search for articles with the keywords: elephant; poaching; Zimbabwe; ivory; 
Africa; sustainable; hunting; conflict. Guided by the DPSIR framework, this 
provided the necessary information about individual poaching factors, which 
contributed to the analysis of the interactions between each factor. The official 
CITES, U.S Fish & Wildlife Services, and ZPWMA websites were used to find 
official documents regarding elephant and ivory policies and proposals. This 
information was used to understand how the policy responses to poaching 
affected the socio-economic poaching factors.   
 
3.2 Analytical Framework  
 
 Fig. 2: The DPSIR Framework. Source: Peter Kristensen: “The DPSIR Framework,” 2004. 
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This paper utilizes the DPSIR (Drivers, Pressures, State, Impacts, and 
Responses) framework, shown in Figure 2. This framework facilitates an 
understanding of the feedback loops of interactions between socio-economic 
factors of poaching and policy responses to increased poaching in Zimbabwe. 
The DPSIR Framework is frequently used by the European Environmental 
Agency to examine the relationship between political choices and ecological 
impacts by analyzing the driving forces, pressures, states, impacts, and 
responses in particular setting (Kristensen 2004). The driving forces categorize 
the social, economic and political factors that are the foundation of an 
environmental problem. The pressures demonstrate the impacts that these 
driving forces have on a natural resource. The state describes the environmental 
change taking place as a result of the drivers and pressures, while the impacts 
describe the environmental effects of these drivers, pressures, and state 
changes. The responses are the policies enacted in order to address any portion 
of the chain between drivers and impacts (Kristensen 2004). In this paper, the 
DPSIR framework allows for the consideration of the causes and effects of 
poaching as a feedback loop, while accounting for new domestic ivory 
restrictions from CITES.  
 
Firstly, the DPSI portion of the framework is used to understand the interactions 
between the social, economic, and political factors which contribute to poaching 
in Zimbabwe. These interactions are discussed independently from policy 
responses, hence only examining interactions between drivers, pressures, state, 
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and impacts. Next, the full DPSIR framework is employed to infer how specific 
CITES policy responses and domestic policy responses affected each part of the 
Drivers, Pressures, State, and Impacts of poaching. Lastly, the results from these 
first two questions are used to outline the aspects of this system that serve as 
barriers to sustainable hunting-based conservation of elephants. These results 
lay out a “map” of the aspects of the entire poaching system to show what can be 
addressed through the reform of existing or creation of new policies to keep 
Zimbabwe's elephant populations healthy.  
 
3.3 Case Study Selection 
Zimbabwe represents an ideal case to apply this DPSIR framework for elephant 
poaching. Zimbabwe hosts the world’s second largest elephant population, with 
nearly 83,000 individuals left (Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management 
Authority 2016). As such, Zimbabwe plays an important role in global elephant 
conservation efforts (Zimbabwe Park & Wildlife Management Authority 2016). 
Elephant populations will continue to decline at unsustainable rates without 
attempts from their habitat range countries, like Zimbabwe, to address poaching 
in the very near future. Zimbabwe also demonstrates how political, social, and 
economic factors contribute to elephant poaching when these factors are 
considered both independently from each other and together. International policy 
responses to poaching have then further exacerbated many of these factors, 
which provides the opportunity to discuss the feedback loops caused by 
interactions between poaching factors and responses.  
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4.0 Findings 
4.1 Socio-economic factors and interactions contributing to elephant 
poaching in Zimbabwe 
This section addresses the first question: what interactions between multiple 
socio-economic factors contribute to poaching in Zimbabwe? In order to answer 
this, the interactions between drivers, pressures, state, and impacts are 
examined, independent of policy responses. This is shown in Figure 3. 
 
        Fig. 3: Interactions between Drivers, Pressures, State, and Impacts.  
      
4.1.2 Drivers 
Population Increase 
As of 2016, Zimbabwe had a population of approximately 14.5 million people with 
an annual growth rate of 2.2% (CIA 2016). As the human population grows, the 
proportion of land used for agriculture outside of protected wildlife areas 
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increases (Gandiwa et al. 2013). This may lead to increased instances of human-
wildlife conflicts in areas where humans live close to protected areas (Gandiwa et 
al. 2013). Human conflicts with elephants arise because elephants frequently 
destroy crops and farmland (Madhusudan & Sankaran 2010). The affected 
humans may poach these elephants out of anger over crop losses, or to 
preemptively protect crops (Mariki et al. 2015). Therefore, human population 
increases contribute to the poaching pressure from human-wildlife conflicts. 
 
Political Corruption 
Transparency International’s 2015 survey concluded that Zimbabwe ranked 150 
out of 168 countries on the global corruption index (Transparency International 
2016). This poor ranking can be traced back to Robert Mugabe, the nation’s first 
and only prime minister. He has remained in power since the country’s first 
election in 1979, and rigged the election in 2002 to secure his position (CIA 
2016). During his reign, Mugabe has allowed Zimbabwe to lose billions of dollars 
from fraud and natural resource smuggling (New Zimbabwe 2016).  
 
There are three notable examples of fraudulent wildlife management that are 
important for understanding the role that political corruption has in the elephant 
poaching system. The first example demonstrates the impact of corruption on 
conservation funding. In the 1980’s, the Zimbabwean government had assured 
CITES that the then legal international ivory trade would fund conservation 
efforts. It was later discovered that the ivory revenues were instead returned to 
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the central treasury (Austin 1992). Resources for anti-poaching monitoring in 
national parks were depleted without these conservation funds, and poaching 
during this time was rampant (Austin 1992). This presents the first link between 
political corruption and poaching. 
 
The second example demonstrates a direct link between political corruption, over 
hunting, and elephant poaching. Some of the largest game reserves are owned 
by the most avid supporters of President Robert Mugabe (Newsweek Staff 2006). 
Many of these reserve owners have no training or experience with wildlife 
conservation, and have been known to ignore the legal hunting quotas set by the 
ZPWMA. Ignoring these quotas contributes to the legal over hunting pressure. 
These reserve owners are also known for allowing poaching inside of the 
protected Hwange National Park (Newsweek Staff 2006).  
 
Lastly, political corruption is reflected in today’s black market ivory trade, which is 
frequently facilitated by corrupt Zimbabwean officials, wildlife guards, and border 
guards (Bennett 2014). This can be attributed to the many impoverished citizens 
and poorly paid wildlife officials within the country who become targets for corrupt 
government officials and organized criminals (Nellemann 2013). This 
demonstrates the link between political corruption, stagnant economy, and 
poaching.   
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Stagnant Economy 
Zimbabwe ranked last out of all countries for unemployment rate, with the 2009 
estimate indicating that 95% of the country is unemployed  (CIA 2016). Though, it 
should be noted that an estimated 90% of Zimbabweans are employed in the 
“informal economy,” which is neither taxed nor regulated by a government (Moyo 
& Onishi 2016). Consequently, 72.3% of Zimbabwe’s population is living below 
the national poverty line, and 21.4% live on less than $1.90 a day (World Bank 
2015). 
 
Tying political corruption and stagnant economy together, Mugabe is responsible 
for the catastrophic state of Zimbabwe's economy. After his controversial land 
reform program in 1997, in which land from 4,000 white farmers was seized and 
redistributed to black farmers as compensation for colonial rule, the country 
faced an economic disaster (Sieff 2015). As a result of this policy, the new black 
farmers who received this land were inexperienced and were not given the 
training and equipment to properly manage these new, large, farms (Wadhams 
2007). As the economy crumbled without the success of their major economic 
staple, the agricultural industry, unemployment and poverty skyrocketed, and 
inflation reached a high of 5,000% (Wadhams 2007). Zimbabwe struggled to 
provide food and basic commodities to its citizens for years after this land reform 
(CIA 2016). 
 
Zimbabweans still have yet to recover from this economic collapse. Poaching has 
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become a means of survival for many Zimbabweans due to the poor state of the 
economy and ongoing political corruption.  Many of the subsistence farmers who 
moved in after the catastrophic land reform program were unable to make a living 
off of the land, and eventually turned to hunting the wildlife that had historically 
been protected on the old private ranches (Wadhams 2007). Without a booming 
agricultural or mineral industry to formally employ citizens, those who remain in 
Zimbabwe are given few other opportunities to make a living, making poaching a 
very tempting option. Therefore, this interaction between political corruption and 
a stagnant economy significantly contributes to poaching. 
 
International Ivory Demand 
Zimbabweans’ appetite for ivory money has largely been satiated by Asian 
demand. In 2013, a Chinese wildlife trade official claimed that the Asian demand 
for ivory required about 220 tons of raw ivory each year, which would require the 
deaths of nearly 20,000 elephants annually (Levin 2013). With China’s middle 
class rapidly expanding, there is an increased number of potential ivory buyers to 
feed the demand for black market ivory. As of 2010, 11.2 % of China’s population 
was living on $1.90 a day, but this number jumped down to an astonishing 1.9% 
in 2013  (World Bank 2015). This presents a poaching feedback loop driven by 
ivory demand. China’s ivory demand drives poaching, which decreases elephant 
populations (Levin 2013). This makes ivory more scarce on the markets, which 
increases its market value (Carrington 2016). With many more potential Chinese 
consumers, the demand for ivory continues to drive an increase in poaching 
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(Carrington 2016). 
 
Political corruption also interacts with this international ivory demand and 
increases poaching. The illegal ivory exchange between African countries and 
China is rampant. As China has continued to strengthen its trade ties with Africa 
since 2009, the opportunities to smuggle ivory through shipments of plastic waste 
and grains have greatly expanded (Swanson 2014). There are also millions of 
Chinese nationals living throughout African ivory supplier states who smuggle 
ivory in their suitcases, which accounts for nearly 90% of ivory seizures in China 
(Swanson 2014). A healthy supply of corrupt Chinese officials, complimented by 
corrupt Zimbabwean border guards, are also willing to perform or facilitate the 
cross-continental transport through diplomatic channels (Swanson 2014; Bennett 
2014). The corruption of these Zimbabwean guards therefore enables the 
satiation of the international demand for ivory (Bennett 2014). This presents an 
interaction between political corruption and international ivory demand, which 
increases poaching.  
 
4.1.3 Pressures 
Over Hunting (legal)  
Zimbabwe’s established annual quota of 500 trophy hunted elephants per year is 
not based on accurate population estimates, making their legal hunting quotas 
potentially unsustainable. These quotas are particularly unsustainable when 
poaching losses are accounted for (USFWS 2015; CITES 2016). Zimbabwe is 
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notorious for inflating their population estimates, as they have historically not 
allowed independent scientific review of their elephant census data and have 
counted non-resident migrating elephants as residents (Austin 1992). This 
exploitation through legal hunting is a result of an interaction between political 
corruption and a stagnant economy, as these factors hinder funding for sound 
scientific research (USFWS 2015).  
 
Impacts 
Poaching has already been discussed as an impact of the stagnant economy. 
However, poaching also exacerbates this economic state by creating a feedback 
loop and contributing to further economic losses. It has been estimated that 
elephant poaching results in a loss of $25 million in economic benefits that would 
have been accrued through tourism in southern Africa’s protected areas (Naidoo 
et al. 2016). Therefore, the stagnant economy, which drives poaching, is further 
impaired by this increased poaching.  
 
4.2 Impact of International Poaching Policy Responses on Poaching 
Factors 
This section integrates policy responses into the poaching factors and 
interactions from the previous section by utilizing the full DPSIR framework. It 
addresses the second research question: how have the policy responses to 
poaching affected these factors and interactions? This section will look at how 
specific CITES policy responses and domestic policy responses affect the 
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Drivers, Pressures, State, and Impacts of poaching, as shown in Figure 4. 
   
  Fig. 4: Interactions Between Drivers, Pressures, State, Impacts, and Policy Responses 
 
4.2.1 Impact of Policy Responses on Drivers 
International Ivory Demand 
The CITES policy to allow for legal limited ivory sales in 1999 and 2008 from 
Zimbabwe to Japan and China was a response intended to decrease 
international ivory demand. In 2008, the two countries purchased 107 tons of 
ivory for $15 million in an effort to flood the Asian markets, which would drive 
down the cost of ivory (Carrington 2016). This would theoretically make poaching 
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a less profitable endeavor, while also bolstering anti-poaching efforts in 
Zimbabwe by putting the ivory profits towards conservation efforts (Carrington 
2016). 
 
The 2008 legal sale preempted “an abrupt significant, permanent, robust and 
geographically widespread increase” in elephant poaching (Hsiang & Sekar 
2016). In their study, Hsiang and Sekar (2016) hypothesize that by permitting this 
massive legal sale, the existing stigma against ivory was negated, which 
ultimately boosted the demand for ivory. It has also been suggested that this 
legal trade enabled a cover for smuggling illegal ivory, so despite the decreased 
price of ivory that this market flooding provided, the demand for ivory and 
consequential poaching both increased as a result of this poaching policy 
response (Carrington 2016).  
 
However, there are now new domestic policy responses from both the U.S and 
China that aim to decrease demand for ivory by committing to complete closure 
of domestic ivory markets. As of December 2016, China is planning to phase out 
their own domestic ivory trade by 2021, which will ban trade of elephant hunting 
trophies, ivory carvings, and will ban all sales on ivory acquired before 1990 (Kao 
2016). The U.S formally banned the import and export of commercial ivory in 
2014. However, there were still large amounts of undocumented and unregulated 
ivory circulating the country, particularly through online platforms such as 
Craigslist (IFAW 2015; Fears 2014). Lack of enforcements and loopholes in the 
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U.S law, such as grandfathering in sale on ivory items that are “pre-ban” or 
“antique”, have allowed domestic ivory markets to continue, despite the 
international CITES ban (IFAW 2015). The U.S has now taken steps to close 
these loopholes and has banned “virtually all sales” of African ivory items within 
the U.S as of 2016 (Arnold 2016). Without any legal trade in these major 
consumer countries, there are fewer venues for smuggling illegal ivory under the 
guise of legal ivory (Carrington 2016). Therefore, this new policy approach may 
be more successful in reducing international ivory demand than limited legal 
sales were.  
 
Stagnant Economy 
The U.S ban on elephant trophy imports interacts with Zimbabwe’s economy in 
two ways. Firstly, this ban is a response to the economic driver that lead to 
pressure of unsustainable legal hunting, as was explored in section 4.1. 
Zimbabwe’s quota of 500 trophy hunted elephants per year was not based on 
accurate population estimates, making their legal hunting quotas potentially 
unsustainable (USFWS 2015; CITES 2016). This policy response is intended to 
prevent U.S tourists, who have historically accounted for nearly 40% of 
Zimbabwe’s trophy hunting revenue, from participating in what the U.S Fish & 
Wildlife Service deemed as unsustainable legal trophy hunting (USFWS 2015). 
 
Secondly, this policy response may negatively interact with Zimbabwe’s 
economic poaching driver. Before the U.S banned domestic ivory markets, trophy 
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ivory was still allowed to be imported. With these bans in place, tourism from 
legal hunting is drastically decreasing because U.S tourists can no longer bring 
back their hunting trophies (Zimbabwe Tourism Authority 2015). Zimbabwe 
specifically mentioned their concerns over these economic losses in their 2015 
Elephant Management Plan (Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management 
Authority 2015). CAMPFIRE hunting quotas from 2014 estimated that about 63% 
of elephant trophies were hunted by US tourists, while other reports from private 
safaris indicated that in 2013, about 40% of their CAMPFIRE contributions came 
from U.S elephant sport hunters (USFWS 2015). It is therefore feasible to 
conclude that the loss of U.S hunting revenue due to this U.S policy response will 
result in a loss of economic revenue for Zimbabwe’s tourism industry, while also 
decreasing the pool of funding for elephant conservation. These two potential 
ramifications as a result of this U.S policy have the potential to further stress the 
economic poaching driver by decreasing revenue in the tourism sector.  
 
4.2.2 Impact of Policy Responses on Pressures 
Human-Wildlife Conflict 
Human-wildlife conflicts present a poaching feedback loop as a result of a policy 
response to poaching. The domestic ivory policies are a direct response to 
elephant population losses (USFWS 2015). These policies are intended to assist 
in the growth of elephant populations, and ultimately lead to fewer routes of 
population control from activities such as trophy hunting. Drawing upon the 
conclusions reached in 4.1, it has been established that human population 
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increases may increase wildlife conflicts, and subsequently increase poaching. If 
the goal of the U.S domestic policy response is to increase elephant populations, 
it is feasible that increased elephant populations may also contribute to more 
instances of human-elephant conflicts as the human population increases as 
well. This again would add stressors to this poaching pressure, creating a 
feedback loop as a result of the U.S domestic policy response to poaching. 
 
This concern has already been raised to the U.S Fish & Wildlife Service. In their 
letter to the U.S Fish & Wildlife Service in 2015, the Safari Club International 
claimed that the U.S ban on trophy imports in 2014 caused an increase of 
human-elephant conflicts from 412 incidents in 2013 to 597 incidents in 2014 
(USFWS 2015). 
 
4.3 Barriers to Sustainable Hunting-Based Conservation 
This section draws upon the conclusions from Sections 4.1 and 4.2 in order to 
answer the last question: which aspects of this system serve as barriers to 
sustainable hunting-based conservation of elephants? These results highlighted 
three aspects of the poaching system that require policy interventions: stagnant 
economy, human-wildlife conflicts, and political corruption, shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Barriers to Sustainable Hunting-Based Conservation 
Barriers Interactions 
Stagnant economy ● Political corruption 
● Legal hunting 
● Poaching 
● Domestic ivory ban 
Human wildlife conflicts  
● Domestic ivory ban 
Political corruption ● Economy 
● Legal hunting 
 
Economic Stagnation 
Zimbabwe’s stagnant economy presents a barrier to sustainable hunting-based 
conservation. Political corruption contributes to this economic barrier because it 
prevents funds from reaching conservation efforts. As a result, the Zimbabwean 
government is unable to conservation ZPWMA itself, so they rely completely on 
donor support and hunting revenue to fund conservation programs (USFWS 
2015). This leads to over hunting, which is attributed to a lack of funding for 
research and corrupt game reserve owners. A poaching feedback loop is the 
result of the stagnant economy driving poaching, which results in tourism losses. 
This further impairs economic growth.  
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The U.S domestic ivory ban also contributes to this economic barrier. This policy 
response may interfere with Zimbabwe’s two sources of funding, donor support 
and hunting revenue. Firstly, donor support is unlikely to come from countries 
that have banned ivory trading and trophy imports or supported these bans. For 
example, the U.S specifically required that their funding for CAMPFIRE could not 
be used to support hunting-based conservation, before revoking their funding all 
together  (USAID 2015). Since so many major international actors, such as the 
U.S., China, and the EU have banned domestic ivory trade (though the EU has 
an exception for trade of ivory acquired before 1990), it is illogical to assume that 
many of the Parties would contribute funds towards Zimbabwe’s program, as it 
inherently relies on the ability to trade ivory and elephant trophies. Secondly, this 
growing support for and implementation of total domestic ivory bans drastically 
reduces the number of tourists who are legally capable of contributing towards 
Zimbabwe’s conservation through sport hunting. These two circumstances pose 
significant challenges for Zimbabwe’s ability to generate funds for its hunting-
based conservation.  
 
Though Zimbabwe remains committed to funding elephant conservation almost 
exclusively through hunting revenue, a publicized effort to encourage more 
traditional eco-tourism, such as photographic safaris, may draw in more donor 
and tourism revenue that can then be put towards conservation efforts. 
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Human-Wildlife Conflicts 
Human-wildlife conflicts may increase due to the feedback loop caused by 
domestic ivory bans. The U.S ivory ban has significantly decreased the number 
of trophy hunters in Zimbabwe, and aims to increase elephant populations. 
Larger human and elephant populations increase the potential for human wildlife 
conflicts, which may lead to more poaching.  
 
This potential for increased poaching is exacerbated by international decisions 
that are out of Zimbabwe’s control. As such, the human wildlife conflict is a key 
area for which Zimbabwe is capable of addressing through new policy 
intervention. Implementing new management strategies to keep elephants and 
humans separate will help to keep elephant populations safe from poaching, 
enabling sustainable growth rates. 
  
Political Corruption  
Political corruption presents an enormous barrier to sustainable hunting-based 
conservation by reducing donor funds and tourism revenue. It also directly 
interferes with Zimbabwe’s ability to conserve its wildlife through legal hunting. 
 
Zimbabwe’s political corruption has impacted its economy by deterring funding 
from international donors and tourism. Zimbabwe was once the “darling” of the 
international donor community, however major donors, including the U.S, ended 
their funding of Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE program due to political corruption and 
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disapproval of hunting-based conservation in the early 2000’s (Taylor 2009; 
USAID 2014). Political corruption also disrupts the tourism sector, a major source 
of income and job creation (World Tourism Organization 2015). Zimbabwe’s 
political corruption and crashed economy have been blamed for deterring many 
tourists from the country during the first decade of the 2000’s (Rihoy, Chirozva & 
Anstey 2010; World Tourism Organization 2015). 
 
Political corruption also presents direct challenges to Zimbabwe’s ability to 
perform sustainable hunting-based conservation. Political corruption resulted in 
an absence of scientifically sound population estimates. This yielded 
unsustainable legal hunting quotas, which were compounded by a lack of 
enforcement of these legal hunting quotas (Austin 1992; Newsweek Staff 2006; 
Hoyt 1994). In addition, political corruption resulted in some of the largest game 
reserves being owned by Mugabe’s main supporters. These owners have no 
training for wildlife conservation, ignore the legal hunting quotas, and even 
enable poaching inside of protected areas (Newsweek Staff 2006). 
 
5.0 Discussion 
This section will reflect back on the three barriers discussed in the previous 
section to propose potential adaptation strategies to keep Zimbabwe's elephant 
populations healthy. 
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Stagnant Economy  
This paper did not intend to argue for or against specific conservation methods. 
However, from a strictly economic perspective, a new focus on an ecotourism 
approach from ZPWMA may provide more financial and conservation benefits 
than the current hunting-based approach.  
 
Zimbabwe’s economic state acts as a barrier to hunting-based conservation 
because the domestic policies imposed by other countries may cut off 
Zimbabwe’s two main sources of conservation funding. Though there is not 
sufficient evidence that ecotourism can completely replace funds from trophy 
hunting, there may be a potential for ecotourism to boost donor funding (IUCN 
2016; USAID 2014). On the official ZPWMA website, there are repeated requests 
from “friendly countries” to donate to their “important hunting industry” to ensure 
that they can properly monitor poaching activity (zimparks.org). As was 
discussed in Section 4.3, the U.S specifically withdrew funding that was to be 
used for hunting-based conservation. By instead focusing on the promotion of 
ecotourism, countries like the U.S who oppose trophy hunting may potentially 
consider funding ecotourism projects.  
 
A potential ecotourism project facilitated by increased the ZPWMA funding may 
involve making improvements to ZPWMA owned lodging in the National Parks, 
which prohibit hunting. Such improvements may encourage tourists to stay at 
ZPWMA-owned facilities as opposed to privately owned facilities, which would 
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increase direct funding to the ZPWMA. For example, the ZPWMA-owned camp 
at Hwange National Park ranks 21 out of 22 lodges in the park on Trip Advisor, 
with privately owned lodging scoring far higher ratings from tourists (Trip Advisor 
2017). A United States Agency for International Development (USAID) report 
supports such improvements. This report indicates that tourism in protected 
areas has suffered in recent decades, and concludes that Zimbabwe must 
“rebrand” their National Park tourism in order to revitalize tourism in the country 
(USAID 2014) 
 
It is important to note that Zimbabwe’s data concerning the contribution of 
ecotourism and hunting in recent years are either unavailable or contradictory, 
making it nearly impossible to make an evidence-based recommendation 
specifically for Zimbabwe. For example, in a meeting with USAID in 2014, 
ZPWMA claimed that that 70% of their revenue in 2013 came from photographic 
tourism, while hunting accounted for less than 30%. (USAID 2014). It is important 
to note that the U.S and Chinese trophy important bans had not yet been 
implemented at this point, which may have otherwise decreased the percentage 
revenue from hunting. That being said, this ZPWMA claim to USAID directly 
conflicts with ZPWMA’s entire basis for their 2015-2020 Elephant Management 
Plan and CITES amendment proposal (discussed in Section 2.2 and 2.1, 
respectively). The management plan and CITES proposal specifically asserted 
that hunting and trophy importing was necessary for conservation, as ecotourism 
would not generate enough income to support their conservation efforts. Given 
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the lack of consistent data on these tourism statistics from Zimbabwe, there is no 
evidence to suggest that ecotourism will be able to replace trophy hunting 
revenue.  
 
However, by potentially increasing donor funding, this strategy may provide a 
necessary boost to Zimbabwe’s economy and anti-poaching efforts (IUCN 2016; 
USAID 2014). This will be necessary in light of domestic ivory bans. These 
potential boosts may contribute to decreased poaching, which may enable any 
continued legal hunting to continue at a rate that is sustainable. 
 
Human Wildlife Conflict 
Human wildlife conflicts present a barrier to hunting-based conservation by 
potentially increasing poaching incidents. These conflicts can be mitigated 
through simple and inexpensive strategies. For example, a non-profit in Tanzania 
has been promoting a four-step solution to mitigating human-elephant conflicts. 
The first step uses a high-powered flashlight, which often scares elephants away 
during night raids. If that doesn’t work, foghorns may be used to confuse and 
deter the elephants. Next, a condom filled with chili powder and a firecracker can 
be lit and thrown towards the elephant to disorient and frighten them. As a last 
step measure, a large firecracker, known as a Roman candle, can be set off 
about 75 feet away from the aggressor elephant, which almost always deters 
them (Learn 2016). Since elephants have great memory, after experiencing the 
third and fourth steps once, the flashlight is usually enough to scare them off if 
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they do come back at a later time. However, this method is disruptive to 
surrounding communities, as the loud noises used to scare off elephants also 
wake up people. This method may also pose safety risks to humans, as it 
requires being close to the elephants.  
 
Another successful method frequently used in Tanzania is to construct sisal 
string fences soaked in engine oil and ground chili around crop areas (Chang’a et 
al. 2016). Since constructing these fences for the last nine years, the farmers 
around Mikumi National Park in Tanzania have reported zero incidents of fences 
being broken by elephants (Chang’a et al. 2016). This method has the benefits of 
being low cost and less dangerous and disruptive than the four-step method.   
 
Not only can such methods be funded and facilitated through non-profits, but 
they can also be funded through ZPWMA. This presents an opportunity for 
ZPWMA to request international funding from donors that don’t wish to contribute 
funding towards hunting-based conservation. By reducing human-wildlife 
conflicts, there may be fewer instances of retaliation poaching, which may enable 
legal hunting to continue sustainably. 
 
Political Corruption 
Political corruption is a major barrier to sustainable hunting-based conservation, 
as it impacts many of the poaching drivers described in Section 4.1. As such, 
there is no specific policy recommendation that can address this issue as a 
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whole. However, it may be possible for ZPWMA to reduce its own association 
with the overarching political corruption within the government. While ZPWMA is 
certainly at an economic disadvantage without government funding, this may 
allow for some degree of freedom from government influence. This may allow for 
ZPWMA to increase transparency on their website as a very preliminary step 
towards decreasing the influence of political corruption. A page documenting 
domestic and international donors on the ZPWMA website may assist in ensuring 
that ZPWMA is crafting their wildlife management decisions based on 
sustainable science, as opposed to political and donor interests.  
 
6.0 Conclusion 
This paper aimed to understand the multiple and interacting factors that influence 
elephant poaching in Zimbabwe. As much of the existing literature covers 
specific poaching factors in isolation, such as government corruption (Bennett 
2014; Nellemann 2013; Varun, Ewing, & Miller 2014), civil conflict (Lemieux & 
Clarke 2009; Schneider 2008), or international ivory demand (Stiles 2004), these 
works fail to account for situations where multiple poaching drivers create 
feedback loops with poaching policy responses. This paper intended to deviate 
from this linear analysis paradigm to take an integrated view that considered 
interactions across factors and feedbacks. As such, this paper also intended to 
account for new ivory restrictions from the last decade, for which Abensperg-
Traun (2009), Frost and Bond (2007), Hutton and Leader-Williams (2003), and 
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Hitch (1998) could not have accounted for in their evaluations of hunting-based 
conservation.  
  
The DPSIR framework introduced the interactions and feedbacks between the 
poaching drivers, pressures, state, impact, and responses. A major feedback 
loop discussed using this framework was an increased poaching risk from 
human-wildlife conflicts as a result of the U.S domestic ivory ban in response to 
poaching. Safari Club International presented this concerning feedback to the 
U.S Fish and Wildlife Services in response to the U.S domestic ivory ban, though 
they did not provide sufficient data to support these claims (USFWS 2015). Safari 
Club International also has a clear vested interest in promoting hunting-friendly 
policies, making their claims potentially biased and exaggerated.  
 
Another key poaching feedback loop was driven by international ivory demand, in 
which China’s ivory demand drives poaching. This increased demand makes 
ivory more scarce on the markets, increases its market value, and therefore 
makes poaching more profitable and frequent (Levin 2013; Carrington 2016). 
This feedback is complemented by the research of Hsiang and Sekar (2016). 
They came to the conclusion that flooding Asian markets with cheap ivory also 
has a strong potential to increase demand and poaching. They ultimately argue 
that the presence of any amount of ivory on the legal Asian market drives 
poaching because it removes the stigma associated with ivory (Hsiang & Sekar 
2016). It is therefore encouraging that China is working towards the complete 
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closure of their domestic markets, as this may address this international ivory 
demand feedback.  
 
The conclusions drawn from this framework were used to highlight the barriers 
that may prevent Zimbabwe from successfully continuing sustainable hunting-
based elephant conservation. These barriers assisted in the identification of 
areas of the poaching system that may be corrected through potential policy 
interventions. Economic stagnation, human wildlife conflicts, and political 
corruption were identified as major hampering factors.  
 
New strategies were then suggested to potentially address each barrier. A focus 
on ecotourism promotion from ZPWMA was recommended to potentially increase 
donor and tourism funds towards conservation. This marketing shift strives to 
address the economic poaching pressures that may make Zimbabwe’s legal 
hunting unsustainable in light of the U.S ivory ban. However, it is important to 
note that there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that ecotourism can 
completely replace revenue from trophy hunting in Zimbabwe (IUCN 2016). 
Zimbabwe’s 2015 Elephant Management Plan specifically argues that 
ecotourism will be a failed approach to conservation, though they don’t provide 
data to support this claim (ZPWMA 2015). In addition, the same political 
corruption that has plagued Zimbabwe’s hunting-based conservation may 
continue to corrode any new approaches to conservation (Mudzengi & Chiutsi 
2014). Whether or not a shift towards ecotourism would actually produce the 
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intended benefits, Zimbabwe has clearly demonstrated their unwillingness to put 
forth such an attempt.  
 
Conversely, there are simple and inexpensive management strategies for 
reducing human wildlife conflicts. One recommendation was the construction of 
chili powder infused fences to keep elephants away from crops. Such a solution 
could provide significant economic and conservation benefits by saving both crop 
yields and elephants (Chang’a et al. 2016). Lastly, increased transparency on the 
ZPWMA website through a donor listings page was recommended to potentially 
distance ZPWMA from the government’s notorious political corruption. This one 
change does not aim to address the overarching political corruption in the 
country, but it may help ZPWMA gain credibility in the international community 
and demonstrate that their management decisions are based on science, not 
donor and political interests. However, even this seemingly small a change may 
not be possible within Zimbabwe’s current political structure. 
 
As humans face impending threats from climate change, sea level rise, and 
pollution, it is important that we do not overlook the species that may face 
extinction far sooner than us. One of many such threatened species, the African 
elephant, is facing a truly dire outlook at the present time. Their populations will 
continue to decline at unsustainable rates without attempts from their habitat 
range countries, like Zimbabwe, to address poaching in the very near future. 
Though the discussed recommendations may not completely fix Zimbabwe’s 
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hunting-based conservation barriers, their identification may be useful in 
Zimbabwe’s decision-making process for elephant management as ivory 
restrictions tighten internationally.  
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